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INTRODUCTION
The post-Cold War context has created a new dynamic and
perhaps a tenser situation that will govern U.S.-European Union
("Union" or "EU") bilateral relations. In October 1994, in a
Paris conference on European security, Commissioner Hans van
den Broek noted that Europe, the United States, Japan, and
Southeast Asia had become the poles of a new quadripolar inter-
national economic system. Neither the Union norJapan, still in
the process of defining new foreign and security strategies, had
found ways to translate their considerable economic strength
into commensurate political influence.
Running parallel with these political changes is the creation
of the new World Trade Organization ("WTO") and the ap-
proval of the Uruguay Round of trade negotiations ("Uruguay
Round"), ushering in a new international economic relations
era. Both the United States and the Union successfully handled
the complex negotiations and the ratification of the Uruguay
Round, after a number of mainly procedural internal delays on
both sides of the Atlantic. The universalism of the WTO augurs
positively for resolving trade disputes between the United States
and the fifteen-member Union.
Nonetheless, it is the divisive trade disputes, rather than the
unifying cultural and historical bonds, that attract attention.
The news stories that U.S. and European citizens read about
each other are more often about trade conflicts than job crea-
tion. EU farm subsidies were a make-or-break issue during the
Uruguay Round negotiations; U.S. countervailing duties on steel
likewise threatened escalating trade tensions.
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In fact, new feuds are brewing, heightened by slow growth,
high unemployment in Europe, continuing industrial restructur-
ing, sharper competition from the Asia-Pacific area, and fiscal
stress at home. Both the United States and Europe are increas-
ingly turning to the temptation of new industrial policies to pro-
mote their respective industries. Government-led industrial pol-
icy unfailingly means new subsidies, tariffs, or restrictions against
lower-cost imports. Industrial policies rooted in "managed
trade" and economic'nationalism of one kind or another tend to
protect special domestic interests and promote national champi-
ons. We have seen evidence of this policy, on both sides of the
Atlantic, in the sectors of agriculture, textiles, and steel. Semi-
conductors, entertainment, services, and investment rules will in-
creasingly pose the same type of difficulties.
I. THE 1990 TRANSATLANTIC DECLARATION AND THE 1994
EU-U.S. BERLIN SUMMIT
It is useful to recall the historical background against which
these new policies and the conflicts they may engender have
evolved. The United States has a long history of supporting and,
some might say, defending the process of European unification,
even in the face of a reassessment of its strategic interests in the
post-Cold War era. The Union remains the largest single trade
and investment partner of the United States. The Transatlantic
Declaration,' adopted by the United States and the European
Community on November 20, 1990, reasserts the common goals
of the two partners and lays out principles of cultural, economic,
educational, and scientific cooperation. The Transatlantic Dec-
laration also sets forth an institutional framework for biannual
consultations between the presidents of the United States and
the EU Commission.
The July 1994 EU-U.S. Summit of Berlin ("Berlin Summit")
set up three temporary groups of experts, which are to report to
the next summit meeting in 1995. They are preparing discus-
sion on three issues: the definition of ways and means to
strengthen democracy and economic cooperation with and be-
tween Central and Eastern European countries through com-
bined EU-U.S. actions, definition of ways and means to improve
1. Transatlantic Declaration, reprinted in PARTNERSHIP: THE EUROPEAN UNION AND
THE UNITED STATES IN THE 1990s 4-5 (1993).
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joint efforts in EU-U.S. international relations, in particular, in
the field of common foreign and security policy and EU-U.S. co-
operation in fighting organized crime and drug trafficking. The
Berlin Summit confirmed the view, shared by the EU and U.S.
policy makers, that current structures can effectively handle dis-
pute resolution even if they cannot anticipate or forestall dis-
putes.
II. EU-US. INSTITUTIONAL COOPERATION: TENTATIVE
MODELS
Technology breakthroughs in fields such as information
technology and telecommunications are changing the economic
structures of European and U.S. societies. Policy makers in both
economic areas, as a result, face similar challenges. Typically di-
vergent approaches to common problems, however, ensure mu-
tually incompatible policy frameworks. At its September 1994
meeting, the U.S.-EU Sub-Cabinet, made up of EU Director Gen-
eral for External Economic Relations Horst G. Krenzler and U.S.
Undersecretary of State for Economic Affairs Dr. Joan Spero,
pledged to develop further the concept of regulatory coopera-
tion in order to decrease trade and investment frictions often
arising from different regulatory systems.
Formal institutionalized bilateral cooperation in the wake of
the 1990 Transatlantic Declaration has in fact taken place only
in a limited number of areas. These areas may provide incipient
models for bilateral trade and investment issues. A few examples
are illustrative of the complex task ahead.
A promising and ambitious example goes under the head-
ing of the "EU-U.S. Information Society Dialogue," whose sec-
ond meeting took place on November 28-29, 1994, in Washing-
ton, D.C. Director General for Telecommunications, Informa-
tion Market and Exploitation of Research Michel Carpentier
represented the Commission, with the U.S. represented by Am-
bassador Vonya McCann. As the Union liberalizes its telecom-
munications infrastructures and the United States introduces re-
forms in the new Congress, possible cooperative opportunities
exist in areas such as mobile telecommunications, intellectual
property rights, satellite communications, universal service, and
standardization. A new round of plenary meetings on the Infor-
mation Society Dialogue is scheduled for the spring of 1995.
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Another tentative model is that of a successful instance of
cooperation on the higher education front. The EU and the
United States face the common challenge of creating and pre-
paring individuals for high quality jobs in a fast changing labor
market. The U.S. Department of Education and the European
Commission's Task Force on Human Resources (now Director-
ate General XXII) launched exploratory cooperation in the area
of higher education. Announced in 1993 and being currently
implemented, twenty-three joint EU-U.S. projects, involving
some two hundred faculties on both sides of the ocean, were
selected from over 240 proposals in five academic areas, includ-
ing environmental and natural sciences.
Preliminary reviews of these projects at a November 1994
conference in San Diego indicate that this innovative form of
multilateral cooperation, each involving partners in a number of
European countries and states of the Union, innovatively ad-
vances the frontiers of knowledge and encourages regional insti-
tutions such as universities that are less skilled at international
collaboration. The program has made faculty and student mo-
bility possible and it has also allowed for the construction of
transatlantic networks. Among these twenty-three joint EU-U.S.
higher education projects is the Georgia Institute of Technol-
ogy's establishment of the Transatlantic Consortium for the
Study of Management of Technology with three partner Euro-
pean graduate institutions, the Twente School of Management
and Technology in The Netherlands, the Henley College of
Management in the United Kingdom, and the Graduate School
of Business of Grenoble, France.
A third example of formal institutionalized collaboration of-
fers the greatest implementation challenges. The EU Commis-
sion and the U.S. Department of Justice signed a bilateral Agree-
ment Regarding the Application of Competition Laws on Sep-
tember 23, 1991 ("Agreement"). It was largely aimed at
enhancing cooperation and effective enforcement of their re-
spective competition laws. The spirit of the Agreement was also
2. Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the
Commission of the European Communities Regarding the Application of their Compe-
tition Laws, 30 I.L.M. 1491 (1991), 61 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1534, at
382 (Sept. 26, 1991).
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predicated on a desire to avoid encroachment on foreign juris-
diction and to reduce conflicts of law.
On the European side, the Agreement was challenged by
three Member States in the European Court of Justice on the
grounds that the Council of Ministers ("Council"), rather than
the Commission, was the proper entity to have signed it. In Au-
gust 1994, the Court found that the Commission lacked the com-
petence to conclude the Agreement, though it did not address
any issue of substance. As a result, the Commission has transmit-
ted a proposal to the Council thereby ensuring compliance with
the Court's decision.
Similarly, the Agreement has raised questions in the United
States as to the eventual enforcement of such an agreement
should the European Commission and the U.S. Department of
Justice take legal action in furtherance of the Agreement. It is
clear that the role of U.S. courts would be paramount in the
Agreement's execution. A recent antitrust consent decree by
Judge Sporkin reaffirms the central role of the judiciary and
hints at a line of legal reasoning that would be applied to this
U.S.-EU antitrust agreement.3 The decision notes that Congress
intended for the courts to "play an independent role in the re-
view of consent decrees as opposed to serving as a mere rubber
stamp."4 In short, the Agreement is not self-enforcing, and must
rely on the review of the federal judiciary in "evaluating the pub-
lic interest."
III. REGULATORY COOPERATION: FERTILE BUT
TREACHEROUS GROUNDS
The main benefits of bilateral regulatory cooperation are
expected to be in the further easing of impediments to trade
between the world's largest trading partners. Small and me-
dium-sized firms require rapid, easy, and cheap access to export
markets. Incompatible regulations are major impediments. The
pace of development and introduction of products further re-
quires flexible and adjustable regulations on both sides of the
Atlantic. Thus, regulatory co0peration could provide a stimulus
to trade as well as to U.S.-EU investment.
Former EU Commission President Jacques Delors is often
3. U.S. v. Microsoft Corp., 159 F.R.D. 318 (D.D.C. 1995).
4. Microsoft, 159 F.R.D. at 329.
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quoted as stating that it behooves policy makers and business
executives to "prevent the deep relationship between the world's
premier powers from descending to the level of disputes about
pasta and hormones. The bond between the Community and
the United States merits better than that."5 The stakes are high:
over US$1 trillion in goods, services, and capital cross the ocean
in both directions every year. This exchange is increasingly
strained.
Regulatory differences are often the cause of trade disputes.
The 1990 Transatlantic Declaration also commits the two parties
to strengthen the multilateral trading system, beyond bilateral
initiatives. Ratification of the WTO and ongoing dialogue on
technical and non-tariff barriers and standards reflect this em-
phasis. The new and stronger General Agreements on Tariffs
and Trade's ("GATT") Technical Barriers to Trade agreement is
also a direct recognition of the commitment to multilateralize
the impact on trade of regulatory divergences. Lacking ade-
quate means to resolve regulatory differences bilaterally, the
United States and the Union have had to escalate disputes to
GATT panels at the multilateral level with unsatisfactory out-
comes. Examples can be adduced.
On the issue of U.S. car taxes, a GATT Panel reviewed the
compatibility of the U.S. luxury excise tax on cars (the so-called
gas-guzzler tax) and the Corporate Average Fuel Economies
("CAFE") penalties with GATT's Article III rules on national
treatment. In September 1994, the Panel decided that the U.S.
luxury car tax was neither protectionist in nature, nor did it have
such an effect, and thus was indeed consistent with the policy
goal of conserving fuel. On the issue of the CAFE requirements,
the Panel found the methodology inconsistent with provisions of
GATT.
A June 1993 GATT Panel ruled that the United States vio-
lated its GATT undertakings by imposing countervailing duties
on imports of hot-rolled lead and bismuth carbon steel from
France, Germany, and the United Kingdom. This particular
GATT Panel was instituted at the request of the European
Union. Its main objective was to examine U.S. government anti-
subsidy decisions imposed as a result of the U.S. steel industry's
5. M.M. NELSON & G. J. IKENBERRY, ATLANrIC FRONTIERS: A NEW AGENDA FOR U.S.-
EC RELATIONS 9 (1993).
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suit against foreign competitors upon the 1992 expiration of the
voluntary export restraint system.
The annual report of the EU Commission Report on U.S.
Barriers to Trade and Investment lists an increasing number of
extant U.S. legislative provisions and pending congressional bills
that condition the principle of national treatment and create the
possibility, in the Commission's view, of discrimination against
U.S. affiliates of European companies.6 Many of these provisions
may give rise to multilateral dispute resolution panels. Proper
bilateral consultation and regulatory cooperation would most
probably forestall utilization of multilateral panels as a last re-
sort.
Issues of conditional national treatment are increasingly the
subject of high-level exchanges between the European Commis-
sion and the U.S. Administration. The bilateral mechanisms do
not provide a satisfactory procedure or format to address these
issues. Regulators must learn from each other. This has begun
in the international technical standards area, e.g., mutual recog-
nition of conformity assessment, good laboratory practices, and
consultations in specified priority sectors, where progress has
been slow but incremental and continuous. This area of possi-
ble regulatory collaboration is far less politicized though no less
complex than trade and investment.
IV. THE SHAPE OF THINGS TO COME: OF BANANAS AND
SEMICONDUCTORS
In January 1995, the EU Commissioner for External Rela-
tions and Common Trade Policy, Sir Leon Brittain, and the U.S.
Special Trade Representative, Mickey Kantor, met and tried un-
successfully to resolve two pending trade regulatory differences.
The first issue concerned the entry of Austria, Finland, and Swe-
den into the Union. The United States, in furtherance of Article
XXIV(6) of GATT, seeks compensation resulting from higher
import duties that the new member countries will levy on chemi-
cals, plastics, electronics, computer components, precision
equipment, and some agricultural products. Such a tariff in-
crease in the high-tech sector is estimated at US$1 billion in ex-
port losses by the United States.
6. SERVICES OF THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION, REPORT ON U.S. BARRIERS TO TRADE AND
INVESTMENT, Doc. No. 1/194/94 (April 1994).
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In the semiconductor sector, Finland and Austria had a
duty-free policy. They now will levy a fourteen percent duty
under the EU Common Customs Tariff. The EU Commission
has said that increased duties are offset by cuts in engineering
product and textile sectors for the new EU member states' exter-
nal tariffs. The Commission may decide to maintain new mem-
bers' import duties at their pre-entry levels, which are usually
lower, until negotiations with the United States are completed.
The second issue worthy of note is the dispute over EU rules
regarding banana imports. EU rules tend to favor bananas from
former British and French colonial areas. Banana imports from
Latin America are limited to about two million tons a year of the
total 3.6 million ton market in the EU. The United States has
stated that the rule impacts negatively on U.S. agribusiness firms
exporting from Latin America and Hawaii, and it has threatened
retaliatory action under Section 301 of U.S. trade laws.
CONCLUSION
The lessons are clear. The trade regulatory issues that di-
vide the United States and the Union should be tackled before
they reach the multilateral WTO conflict resolution machinery.
Until EU-U.S. economic relations are better aligned and antici-
patory mechanisms of cooperation are put in place, global trade
agreements and dispute resolutions will be difficult to reach.
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